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Drawing the Line: The Legality of Using Wiretaps to 
Investigate Insider Trading 
Shane Miller* 
The critically acclaimed television series The Wire ran for five seasons on 
HBO before going off the airwaves in 2008.1 The show depicted how Baltimore 
police officers used wiretaps to eavesdrop on city drug lords.2 Although The Wire’s 
plot was compelling, its storyline could be taken in an entirely new direction if the 
series aired today. In the past, wiretaps were used almost exclusively to investigate 
drug offenses and homicides.3 The Wire accurately portrayed this reality.4 In recent 
years, however, law enforcement has employed wiretaps to investigate an entirely 
different kind of crime: insider trading.5 
Although wiretaps have been extremely effective in taking down insider 
trading rings, the precise scope of the government’s power to use a wiretap for this 
purpose remains unclear.6 This article examines this issue in the following manner. 
Part I describes how the government used wiretaps in the past, how its use of 
wiretaps has changed in recent years, and why any expansion of wiretap privileges 
could have privacy implications for millions of citizens. Part II examines Title III, 
the federal statute that governs the use of wiretaps. Part III defines insider trading, 
discusses how it is regulated, and explains why law enforcement recently started 
using wiretaps to fight insider trading. Part IV analyzes the landmark case of 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, May 2014; B.A., Business, Emory 
University. 
1 About the Show, HBO THE WIRE, http://www.hbo.com/the-wire/index.html#/the-
wire/about/index.html. 
2 Id. 
3 Thomas Hogan, Applications for Orders Authorizing or Approving the Interception of Wire, 
Oral, or Electronic Communications, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF 
THE UNITED STATES COURTS (June 2012), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
Statistics/WiretapReports/2011/2011WireTap.pdf. 
4 About the Show, supra note 1. 
5 See James O’Toole, Perfect Hedge: 56 Found Guilty of Insider Trading, CNN MONEY (Jan. 31, 
2012, 11:29 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/01/24/news/economy/insider_trading/index.htm. 
6 Howard J. Kaplan, Joseph A. Matteo & Richard Sillett, The History and Law of Wiretapping 





J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XIII – Spring 2013 ● ISSN 1087-6995 (print) 2164-800X (online) 










United States v. Rajaratnam and determines whether the court’s ruling is consistent 
with Title III. Finally, Part V offers recommendations and conclusions. 
I. WIRETAPS & CELL PHONES 
A wiretap is the “acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic, or oral 
communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical, or other device.”7 
Wiretaps are usually used to investigate drug crimes, as evidenced by the fact that 
narcotics investigations accounted for 85% of all wiretap applications in 2011.8 
Homicide investigations are the second most prevalent use for wiretaps.9 In 2011, 
judges authorized 2,732 wiretaps nationwide, with telephone wiretaps constituting 
96% of this total.10 
Wiretaps on landline phones have sharply decreased in recent years due to the 
proliferation of mobile devices such as cell phones and smart phones.11 The 
prevalence of mobile devices is quite startling, as nearly nine out of ten American 
adults now have a cell phone.12 Amazingly, given that some individuals own 
multiple phones, there are now more cell phones than people in the United States.13 
Given the rapid growth of mobile devices, it is not surprising that nearly all 
wiretaps are now placed on cell phones and pagers.14 
The scope of the government’s eavesdropping power has privacy implications 
for all Americans. If the government is granted ever-greater wiretap authority, an 
individual’s next private phone call could be monitored even if she is not suspected 
of unlawful activity. In one recent investigation, for example, investigators 
intercepted 18,150 separate phone calls among 550 different individuals.15 Such 
broad eavesdropping power requires close scrutiny by the public. 
                                                          
7 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006). 
8 Hogan, supra note 3, at 10. 
9 Id. at 8. 
10 Id. at 9. 
11 Id. at 7. 
12 Joanna Brenner, Pew Internet: Mobile, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 31, 2013), http:// 
pewinternet.org/Commentary/2012/February/Pew-Internet-Mobile.aspx. 
13 Cecilia Kang, Number of Cellphones Exceeds U.S. Population:  CTIA Trade Group, WASH. 
POST BUS. (Oct. 11, 2011, 7:54 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/number-of-
cell-phones-exceeds-us-population-ctia-trade-group/2011/10/11/gIQARNcEcL_blog.html. 
14 Hogan, supra note 3, at 7. 
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II. THE FEDERAL WIRETAP STATUTE 
The government’s wiretap and electronic surveillance authority is regulated 
primarily by a federal statute, Title III.16 Evidence gathered from a wiretap can be 
suppressed in court if the government fails to comply with the statute’s strict 
requirements.17 
Title III requires the government to obtain judicial approval before using 
electronic devices to intercept a “wire, oral or electronic communication.”18 
Therefore, when seeking a wiretap the government must first provide probable 
cause that an individual is engaging or about to engage in criminal activity.19 The 
government then must prove that the communications dealing with the particular 
offense will likely be intercepted by a wiretap.20 Moreover, the issuing judge must 
be convinced (1) that normal investigative procedures have been exhausted and 
failed, (2) that the normal investigative procedures, if reasonably tried, will be 
unlikely to succeed, or (3) that they would be too dangerous if carried out.21 
This three-step process is known as the “necessity” requirement.22 Given that 
wiretaps create a tremendous intrusion into personal privacy, Congress included the 
“necessity” provision to ensure that law enforcement try less invasive investigative 
techniques before resorting to a wiretap.23 
Furthermore, Title III states that a wiretap cannot be used to investigate every 
type of unlawful activity. Instead, the statute authorizes the interception of 
communications only when certain crimes are under investigation.24 These so-
called “predicate offenses” are enumerated in § 2516 of Title III.25 The extensive 
list of predicate offenses includes many serious crimes such as terrorism, 
                                                          
16 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006); Kenneth M. Breen & Sean T. Haran, The Rise of Wiretaps 
and Government Eavesdropping in Securities Fraud Cases, 35 CHAMPION 43, 43 (May 2011). 





22 Peter J. Henning, Judging if Wiretaps Are Necessary, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2012), http:// 
dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/10/25/judging-if-wiretaps-are-necessary/. 
23 United States v. Lilla, 699 F.2d 99, 102–03 (2d Cir. 1983). 
24 Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972). 
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assassination, murder for hire, money laundering, and racketeering.26 Congress has 
expanded the list over the years when it determines that law enforcement needs 
broader wiretap power.27 
Notably, although wire fraud is included, neither insider trading nor securities 
fraud is listed as a predicate offense in § 2516.28 Under Title III’s “plain-view” 
exception, however, law enforcement can still use a wiretap to investigate a non-
predicate offense, such as insider trading, in certain situations.29 This exception 
allows the government to gather evidence about a non-predicate offense with a 
wiretap if the information is obtained while lawfully investigating a predicate 
offense listed in § 2516.30 The plain-view exception ensures that law enforcement 
is not forced to ignore illegal activity that is uncovered during the course of another 
lawful investigation.31 
Finally, Title III requires the government to make a reasonable effort to 
minimize the interception of communications that are unrelated to the crime being 
investigated.32 Thus, while monitoring calls, law enforcement must stop listening 
when the conversation concerns topics unrelated to the investigation.33 
III. INSIDER TRADING 
In general, an individual is guilty of insider trading if she purchases or sells 
securities while in possession of material, non-public information in a manner that 
breaches a fiduciary duty owed to shareholders or the information source.34 Courts 
have expanded this definition, holding that insider trading occurs when an 
individual: 
                                                          
26 Id.; Breen & Haran, supra note 16, at 43–44. 
27 Kaplan et al., supra note 6, at 6. 
28 Breen & Haran, supra note 16, at 43. 
29 Kaplan et al., supra note 6, at 6. 
30 Id. 
31 Breen & Haran, supra note 16, at 44. 
32 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (2006). 
33 JOHN C. HUESTON, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INSIDER TRADING INVESTIGATIONS AND HOW TO 
RESPOND 1, 5 (Thomson Reuters/Aspatore 2012). 
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(1) breaches a fiduciary duty or other relationship of 
trust and confidence by purchasing or selling a security 
while in possession of material, non-public information; 
(2) “tips” others to material, non-public information; 
(3) trades securities after receiving a “tip”; or 
(4) trades securities after “misappropriating” material, 
non-public information.35 
The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) Enforcement Division 
and the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) Fraud Section prosecute insider trading 
through Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and its corresponding 
regulation, Rule 10b-5.36 Both agencies have vigorously pursued insider trading 
investigations in recent years, possibly in response to their failure to sufficiently 
regulate financial institutions in previous years.37 In fact, the SEC has filed more 
insider trading actions in the last three years than it has during any other three-year 
period in the agency’s history.38 These cases have targeted a wide variety of 
powerful corporate executives, including chief executive officers, financial 
professionals, hedge fund managers, corporate insiders, and attorneys.39 
An insider trading investigation is normally triggered by the occurrence of 
suspicious trading activity, such as when a large stock purchase or sale occurs right 
before a major corporate announcement.40 The government then typically tries to 
make its case by using circumstantial evidence such as telephone calls, e-mails, and 
meetings to tie the suspect to a corporate insider.41 After establishing this link, the 
prosecution then asks the fact finder to infer that the suspect engaged in insider 
trading by pointing to subsequent trading activity in which the suspect achieved 
significant financial gains or avoided sizable losses.42 
                                                          
35 Patrick Craine & Lashon Kell, Prosecuting Insider Trading: Recent Developments and Novel 
Approaches, 59 THE ADVOC. (TEXAS) 45, 45 (Summer 2012). 
36 Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
37 Breen & Haran, supra note 16, at 43. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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Law enforcement is well aware that insider trading is pervasive at some 
financial institutions.43 Past investigations revealed the existence of so-called 
“expert-network firms.”44 These firms are designed to connect finance 
professionals with corporate insiders willing to provide nonpublic information for a 
generous fee.45 In other cases, investigators learned that inside traders covered their 
illegal activity with mafia-like tactics, such as secrets meetings, disposable cell 
phones, and cash kickbacks.46 
The government turned to wiretaps after concluding that traditional methods 
of investigation were inadequate to fight the insider trading epidemic.47 According 
to law enforcement, the finance industry is a tightly knit circle, thus making it 
difficult for undercover sources or informants to infiltrate insider trading 
networks.48 Moreover, potential informants have little incentive to cooperate, 
knowing that their business careers will be finished if their identity is uncovered.49 
The government also favors wiretaps because recorded conversations can 
provide direct evidence of insider trading.50 Sophisticated investors buy and sell 
stocks quite frequently, making it difficult for law enforcement to differentiate 
between normal everyday trading and illegal insider trading.51 Without direct 
evidence obtained from wiretaps, prosecutors may struggle to gather enough 
circumstantial evidence to secure an insider trading conviction.52 
                                                          
43 Ailsa Chang, Wall Street Wiretaps: Investigators Use Insiders’ Own Words to Convict Them, 
NPR (Dec. 26, 2012, 3:25 AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/12/26/168021457/wall-street-wiretaps-
investigators-use-insiders-own-words-to-convict-them. 
44 Katherine Burton, Paul M. Barrett & Saijel Kishan, The Rajaratnam Conviction: How Big a 
Victory?, BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK MAG. (2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/ 
11_21/b4229006268073.htm. 
45 Id. 
46 SEC Charges 14 in Wall Street Insider Trading Case, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2007, 5:03 PM), 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2007/03/01/sec-insidertrading-idUKN01350020070301. 
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IV. UNITED STATES V. RAJARATNAM—DID THE COURT GET IT RIGHT? 
A. Background 
In 2008, law enforcement took the gloves off and elected to use a wiretap to 
investigate insider trading for the first time.53 This momentous investigation 
targeted Raj Rajaratnam, the founder of Galleon Group, an enormously profitable 
hedge fund.54 At the height of its prosperity in early 2008, Galleon controlled more 
than $7 billion in assets and produced staggering returns year after year.55 
On March 7, 2008 the government submitted an application to tap 
Rajaratnam’s cell phone in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of 
New York.56 The court granted a 30-day wiretap, and the government began 
intercepting communications on Rajaratnam’s cell phone shortly thereafter.57 
However, the government needed more evidence to build its case and subsequently 
received permission to tap nine more phones over the next sixteen months.58 The 
authorities ultimately recorded 18,150 separate phone calls among 550 different 
individuals in the course of their investigation.59 
The government’s painstaking and extensive investigation finally paid off on 
October 16, 2009, when Rajaratnam and more than twenty associates were arrested 
and charged with multiple counts of conspiracy and securities fraud.60 A jury 
convicted Rajaratnam of fourteen counts of insider trading and conspiracy after a 
lengthy trial on May 11, 2011.61 He received eleven years in prison, the longest 
sentence ever imposed for an insider trading case.62 He was also required to pay a 
$10 million fine, give back $53 million in profits, and pay $92 million to the SEC 
                                                          
53 Analysis—Insider Trading Wire Taps Sign of Things to Come, REUTERS (Oct. 20, 2009, 5:28 
PM), http://news.alibaba.com/article/detail/technology/100186869-1-analysis-insider-trading-wire-taps-
sign.html. 
54 HUESTON, supra note 33, at 1. 
55 Id. at 2. 
56 United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 WL 4867402 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 24, 2010). 
57 Id. 
58 Kaplan et al., supra note 6, at 5. 
59 Id. 
60 Rajaratnam, 2010 WL 4867402, at 2. 
61 Breen & Haran, supra note 16, at 1. 
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as part of a civil suit.63 Ultimately, Rajaratnam’s own words sealed his fate, as the 
wiretapped conversations between Rajaratnam and his associates provided the 
crucial evidence the prosecution needed to secure a conviction.64 
B. The Suppression Hearing 
At a suppression hearing before his trial, Rajaratnam vigorously argued that 
the wiretapped conversations were not authorized under Title III and thus should be 
excluded at trial.65 He advanced four main arguments.66 First, he asserted that the 
government could not use wiretaps to investigate insider trading because securities 
fraud is not listed as a predicate offense under § 2516 of Title III.67 Second, the 
government had failed to establish the probable cause necessary to receive wiretap 
authority.68 Third, the government had not proven that the wiretaps were 
“necessary” because it had failed to show that conventional investigative 
techniques were inadequate.69 Finally, Rajaratnam argued that the conversations 
should be suppressed because the government failed to minimize its interception of 
phone conversations that were unrelated to insider trading.70 
C. The Importance of Rajaratnam 
Given that Rajaratnam is the first case in which wiretaps were used to 
investigate insider trading, the court’s decision may guide other courts in future 
cases. Thus, the ruling requires careful analysis to ensure that the court properly 
interpreted the scope the government’s wiretap authority under Title III. As this 
article argues, the Rajaratnam decision is controversial and may exceed the 
boundaries of Title III. 
D. Did the Court Get It Right? 
Rajaratnam’s first argument—that the wiretaps were illegal because securities 
fraud or insider trading are not listed as predicate offenses under Title III—
deserves closer examination. As stated earlier, a wiretap may only be used when 
                                                          
63 Id. 
64 Breen & Haran, supra note 16, at 1. 
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certain crimes—known as predicate offenses—are under investigation.71 However, 
under the plain view exception, the government may gather evidence of a non-
predicate offense, such as insider trading, if the information is obtained by a 
wiretap that is lawfully being used to investigate a predicate offense.72 
At the suppression hearing, Federal District Court judge Richard J. Howell 
soundly rejected Rajaratnam’s argument that the wiretapped conversations should 
be suppressed because insider trading is not listed as a predicate offense.73 
According to the court, the government can use wiretap evidence of crimes not 
specified in § 2516 if it can show that “the original wiretap order was lawfully 
obtained, that it was sought in good faith and not as a subterfuge search, and that 
the communication was in fact incidentally intercepted during the course of a 
lawfully executed order.”74 The court ruled that the government acted in good faith 
because it candidly revealed its intention to use the wiretap to investigate securities 
fraud.75 Furthermore, it held that communications concerning insider trading were 
intercepted “incidentally” because they were a mere “by-product” of the of the 
government’s lawful investigation into the predicate offense of wire fraud.76 
However, the court acknowledged that Rajaratnam differed from a typical 
plain-view exception case.77 Normally, the exception applies when government 
receives authorization to investigate a predicate offense with a wiretap and then 
“happens upon” an entirely different crime.78 In Rajaratnam, however, the 
government clearly expected the wiretap to yield evidence of a non-predicate 
offense, insider trading.79 
The court’s ruling is troubling in several respects. First, the government 
appears to have used wire fraud as a pretext to investigate insider trading. This 
conclusion is supported by the fact that the government never charged Rajaratnam 
with wire fraud.80 Judge Howell held that the issuance of a wiretap is not 
                                                          
71 Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 46 (1972). 
72 Kaplan et al., supra note 6, at 6. 
73 Rajaratnam, 2010 WL 4867402, at *1. 
74 Id. at 3. 
75 Id. at 4. 
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contingent upon a specific charge actually being levied against a defendant because 
a judge issuing a wiretap is unable to foresee which charges will ultimately be 
brought against the defendant.81 Nevertheless, the fact that authorities charged 
Rajaratnam with fourteen different counts of conspiracy and securities fraud—and 
zero counts of wire fraud—surely suggests that wire fraud served as a pretext to get 
a wiretap to investigate insider trading. Moreover, the SEC had been investigating 
Rajaratnam for insider trading as early as 1999, suggesting that insider trading—
not wire fraud—had long been the target of the investigation.82 
The court also erred in holding that the insider trading communications were 
intercepted “incidentally” by the wiretap. Judge Howell distinguishes between 
“incidental” and “inadvertent” interceptions.83 He states that the communications 
were not intercepted “inadvertently” but holds that they were intercepted 
“incidentally” and thus lawfully.84 
Judge Howell draws a false distinction between “incidental” and 
“inadvertent” interceptions. First, it is hard to believe that these communications 
could have been intercepted “incidentally” but not “inadvertently” because the two 
words essentially mean the same thing. “Incidental” is defined as “being likely to 
ensue as a chance or minor consequence” or “occurring merely by chance or 
without intention or calculation.”85 “Inadvertent” means “unintentional.”86 Taken 
together, both words mean “unintentional,” “without intention,” or “by chance.” 
Furthermore, Judge Howell admits that the Second Circuit has used both words 
interchangeably in prior decisions, further supporting this article’s contention that 
they mean the same thing.87 Therefore, given that the two words carry the same 
meaning and have been used interchangeably by the courts, it is hard to support 
Judge Howell’s conclusion that the communications could somehow be intercepted 
“incidentally” but not “inadvertently.” In short, given that he held that the 
wiretapped conversations were not intercepted inadvertently, he also should have 
concluded that they were not intercepted incidentally and thus were unlawful. In 
                                                          
81 United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at *4 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 24, 2010). 
82 Id. at 9. 
83 Id. at 5. 
84 Id. 
85 Incidental Definition, M-W.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/incidental (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2013). 
86 Inadvertent Definition, M-W.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/inadvertent 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2013). 
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reality, the communications concerning insider trading were intercepted 
intentionally, not incidentally or inadvertently, because the government had been 
investigating Rajaratnam for years and tapped his phone with the specific purpose 
of discovering evidence of insider trading.88 
More importantly, the court’s ruling is at odds with the policy behind Title III. 
The statute grants the government limited, not absolute, wiretap authority.89 
Congress feared that if Title III were construed too broadly and wiretap authority 
were granted too freely, the statute may essentially become “the electronic 
equivalent of a general search warrant,” thereby allowing the government to 
eavesdrop on almost any conversation it desired.90 “The purpose of the legislation 
. . . was effectively to prohibit . . . all interceptions of oral and wire 
communications, except those specifically provided for in the Act. . . .”91 
“Although Title III authorizes invasions of individual privacy under certain 
circumstances, the protection of privacy was an overriding congressional 
concern.”92 “It was recognized that unless stringent detail were required the 
government might obtain an overly broad wiretap authorization for one offense as a 
pretext for gaining information with respect to offenses . . . for which wiretap 
authorization would be unavailable.”93 Given that the legality of wiretaps for 
insider trading investigations is unclear at best, and that Congress clearly intended 
to limit the government’s wiretap authority, the Rajaratnam court errs by giving 
the benefit of the doubt to the government and not the defendant. 
Moreover, the absence of securities fraud or insider trading from the list of 
predicate offenses is not a mere oversight by Congress. Congress has amended 
Title III in the past when it concludes that law enforcement needs greater wiretap 
authority.94 For example, the list of predicate offenses was expanded to include 
bank fraud in 1990, aircraft parts fraud in 2000, and computer fraud in 2001.95 
Thus, until securities fraud or insider trading expressly appear on the list of 
                                                          
88 Kaplan et al., supra note 6, at 9. 
89 United States v. Brodson, 528 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1975). 
90 Id. at 215. 
91 United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974). 
92 Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 (1972). 
93 United States v. Masciarelli, 558 F.2d 1064, 1067 (2d Cir. 1977). 
94 United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 WL 4867402 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 
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predicate offenses, it should be concluded that Congress does not wish to grant law 
enforcement wiretap authority for these crimes.96 
Finally, although the Rajaratnam court does not hold that the securities fraud 
is a predicate offense, its ruling ultimately has this effect.97 In the court’s view, as 
long as the government can create a good faith case of wire fraud, it can prove that 
an investigation into securities fraud or insider trading was not a subterfuge 
search.98 Since the court has set an extremely low bar for demonstrating a good 
faith case of wire fraud—all the government must do is candidly reveal how it 
intends to use the wiretap—insider trading has effectively been transformed into a 
predicate offense. 
Subsequent cases have justified this concern. In United States v. Gupta, a case 
involving the prosecution of Rajaratnam’s associate, the court interpreted Judge 
Howell’s opinion in Rajaratnam as follows: “[so] long as the Government acts in 
good faith with respect to informing the Court of the crimes it is investigating and 
learning of in connection with the wiretap . . . the Government is free to use 
evidence obtained from an authorized wiretap in the prosecution of a non-predicate 
crime. . . .”99 
The Rajaratnam court also ruled that it made little sense to distinguish 
between wire fraud and securities fraud, noting, “unlikely is the insider trading 
scheme that uses no interstate wires.”100 Because it concluded that the two crimes 
are essentially one and the same, the court held that government did not use wire 
fraud as a pretext to investigate insider trading.101 However, securities fraud and 
wire fraud are comprised of different elements, a fact Judge Howell ultimately 
acknowledges.102 Simply put, wire fraud and securities fraud are two separate 
crimes, and only wire fraud is listed as a predicate offense under § 2516 of Title 
III.103 
                                                          
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 6. 
98 Id. 
99 United States v. Gupta, No. 11 Cr. 907 (JSR), 2012 WL 1066817 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
100 United States v. Rajaratnam, No. 09 Cr. 1184 (RJH), 2010 WL 4867402, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 24, 2010). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Given the Rajaratnam court’s dubious reasoning, the government’s authority 
to investigate insider trading with a wiretap is questionable at best and illegal at 
worst. However, insider trading is a crime worth fighting, for it undermines public 
confidence in the financial markets, increases risk for average investors, and 
creates an unfair advantage for corporate insiders.104 
As it stands, the law does not permit the government’s use of wiretaps to 
investigate insider trading in a case like Rajaratnam. To be sure, other factual 
circumstances may lead to a different conclusion, such as when evidence of insider 
trading is truly uncovered “incidentally” or “inadvertently” during a lawful wiretap 
investigation. Nonetheless, Congress should add securities fraud to the list of 
predicate offenses in § 2516 of Title III. This would give law enforcement clear 
authority to investigate insider trading with a wiretap. As Judge Jed Rakoff wrote 
in United States v. Gupta: “The simple truth is that . . . insider trading cannot often 
be detected, let alone successfully prosecuted, without the aid of wiretaps.”105 If 
Congress determines that the benefits of prosecuting insider trading rings exceeds 
the privacy concerns raised by wiretaps, then insider trading should be added as a 
predicate offense under § 2516. 
Such a decision could have privacy implications for millions of Americans. 
With more cell phones being used and more wiretaps being placed on those cell 
phones than ever before, one can reasonably wonder whether the benefits of 
increased government surveillance outweighs the potential violations of individual 
privacy. Rather than having the courts struggle to set the boundaries on the 
government’s wiretap power in insider trading investigations, Congress should give 
law enforcement express authority. Until then, however, courts should abide by the 
clear language of the statute. 
                                                          
104 Why Insider Trading is Hard to Define, Prove, and Prevent, KNOWLEDGE @ WHARTON, 
http://www.knowledgeatwharton.com.cn/index.cfm?fa=printArticle&articleID=2140&languageid=1 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2013). 
105 United States v. Gupta, No. 11 Cr. 907 (JSR), 2012 WL 1066817 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
